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LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTERPRETATION IN VISUAL PERCEPTION 
1 
Abstract 
Attempts to explain any perceptual phenomena usually do so exclusively 
in terms of neurophysiological mechanisms on the one hand, or in terms 
of inferred cognitive processes on the other. Alternative theoretical 
approaches offer a combination of these positions. The realisation that 
numerous phenomena can be accounted for by both major theories has 
lead to confusion of interpretation. One example is the reduction of 
dominance of a percept of a reversible figure after prolonged exposure to 
an unambiguous stimulus. Typically, the percept which resembles the 
unambiguous stimulus is seen for a smaller proportion of the subsequent 
viewing period. 
The neurophysiological account of this phenomenon holds that the 
groups of cells responding to the unambiguous stimulus become fatigued 
during adaptation so that during subsequent viewing of the ambiguous 
stimulus the most active group of cells will dominate. The alternative, 
cognitive explanation proposes that one of the effects of prolonged 
viewing or adaptation may shift the rate of accumulation of evidence for a 
particular perspective interpretation. Within this cognitive context one 
may speculate that prolonged inspection of an unambiguous stimulus 
simply creates a preference for whichever interpretation of the ambiguous 
stimulus is the more novel. 
Proponents of these dichotomous approaches believe that every perceptual 
phenomena need only be explained by one theory. However, as some 
phenomena can be explained by both approaches, an integrated approach 
in which visual processing at a physiological level is influenced by 
cognitive processes may be warranted. 
A modified experimental procedure to enable the independent 
manipulation of the physiological and cognitive components of this visual 
effect, was suggested. 
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1. Introduction and Aims 
Since the 1950's a large body of research has been developed to 
enhance the understanding of the physiology thought to underpin visual 
perception. A further approach has developed an equally valid theoretical 
account of perception in terms of inferred mental processes or cognitive 
factors. In addition to these dichotomous viewpoints, several alternatives 
have been put forward, generally proposing a combination of the two 
major approaches, including a multilevel and a two stage account. 
Although not directly stated, a theoretical rift has developed between the 
proponents of the two major approaches. The literature also reveals that 
the conflict has been enhanced by a commonly adopted experimental 
procedure. This procedure, is variously termed selective-adaptation or 
transfer of decrement and is generally referred to as the adaptation 
paradigm. This paradigm reveals that contrary to the expectations of those 
who use it, it does not allow verification or falsification of either of the 
two major theoretical positions. 
The objectives of this paper therefore are to examine the evidence 
in support of the major theoretical approaches in vision research and their 
alternatives. Specifically, the aim is to investigate the various 
interpretations of one phenomenon, a special case of perceptual 
alternations. The prolonged exposure of an unambiguous stimulus affects 
the relative dominance of the percepts in subsequently presented 
ambiguous figures. This adaptation effect will be detailed for several 
reasons. Firstly because it has been explained by both major theoretical 
positions and, secondly, it is generated by the contentious paradigm. 
Lastly, it is intended to consider the adaptation paradigm and detail how it 
may be modified to provide a resolution to the theoretical impasse in the 
interpretation of relative dominance changes. 
Outline  
The vast body of research in support of the dominant 
neurophysiological approach to visual perception will be briefly outlined 
in section 2. In section 3, the cognitive approach will be introduced, as 
this is generally considered to be the major theoretical position opposing 
the neurophysiological approach. Explanations of several phenomena 
including a special case of perceptual alternations will demonstrate this 
position. Research findings based on two alternative theoretical 
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approaches will be discussed in sections 4 and 5. In an attempt to 
determine which of the theoretical approaches to accept some researchers 
have looked to the experimental paradigms for answers. The adaptation 
paradigm is discussed in section 6. Section 7 will consider the 
approaches to visual perception and the adaptation paradigm. This section 
aims to clarify the issue of interpretation for the change in relative 
dominance that occurs when an ambiguous stimulus is presented after the 
prolonged inspection of an unambiguous stimulus. Finally, Section 8 will 
conclude by proposing an experimental strategy to resolve the issue of 
interpretation for relative dominance changes. 
2. The Neurophysiological Model: The Link Between Single 
Cell Activity and Perceptual Effects 
Throughout the recorded history of visual perception there have 
been repeated attempts to provide comprehensive theories of perceptual 
phenomena in terms of neural interaction (e.g., Kohler, 1940; McDougall, 
1902, 1903a, 1903b, 1906). The current era of discussion of sensory 
phenomena in neurophysiological terms began with the pioneering work 
of Hubel and Wiesel in the 1950's. Recordings of single cell activity in 
the striate cortex of anaesthetised cats confirmed the existence of cells 
specific for position, size and movement (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968). 
Subsequently single cell activity was linked to perceptual effects in human 
vision. 
Motion Aftereffect  
Barlow and Hill (1963) were possibly the first to take Hubel and 
Wiesel's findings further. They confirmed the existence of cells selective 
for the direction of motion after observing that the firing rate of cells 
diminished with the repeated stimulation of a stimulus moving in one 
direction. Later studies reported that the prolonged viewing of a stimulus 
moving in one direction induced a strong sensation of opposite motion 
when a stationary test stimulus was subsequently viewed (Masland, 1969; 
Mayhew & Anstis, 1972). This motion aftereffect (MAE) is explained by 
the fatiguing of directionally specific cells in humans. 
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Spatial Frequency Shift  
A further example of the stimulus specificity of visual cells was 
demonstrated by the 'spatial frequency shift'. Prolonged inspection of a 
striped pattern by an observer who then views a pattern of the same 
orientation with narrower stripes, perceives the stripes as narrower than 
they actually are, and broader stripes seem even broader. Blakemore and 
Sutton (1969) claimed that this effect implied evidence of a system of size-
detecting channels in human vision. 
The motion aftereffect and the spatial frequency shift are examples 
of perceptual phenomena that can be aCcounted for by the activity of 
neurones 'tuned' to one stimulus characteristic e.g., motion and size. 
Neurones sensitive to multiple stimulus characteristics have also been 
discovered. 
Colour Contingent Aftereffects 
McCollough (1965) reported a colour aftereffect (CAE) contingent 
on orientation. This effect was originally produced by exposing subjects 
to a grating of vertical black stripes on an orange background, alternated 
every few seconds with a horizontal grating on a blue background. When 
subjects were asked to view a test display of black and white vertical and 
horizontal gratings side by side, most reported seeing a desaturated blue 
green on the background of the vertical lines and orange on the horizontal 
portion. The generally accepted explanation of this effect, referred to as 
the McCollough Effect (ME) suggests that the colouration of the 
achromatic horizontal or vertical grid is the result of the adaptation or 
fatiguing of sensory cells sensitive to both colour and orientation. 
For two of these effects, the MAE and the spatial frequency shift, 
a neuronal basis has been confirmed by recording the activity of single 
cells. An unfortunate consequence of this technological advance is that 
the majority of researchers now assume that all visual effects are 
explicable in neurophysiological terms even when evidence is provided to 
the contrary. 
For example, Uhlarik et al. (1977) showed that the McCollough 
hues faded when observers intentionally caused the subjective 
organisation of the test stimulus to change, inferring that cognitive factors 
affect the hues in the ME. Broerse and Crassini (1981) had difficulty 
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accepting this interpretation noting a 'bias in direction of causation' in 
Uhlarik et al.'s (1977) work. They commented that if the perceived 
organisation alters the appearance of the colours then it is equally likely 
that the colours may alter perceptual organisation, and pointed out that this 
possibility was not investigated. This may be correct but Broerse and 
Crassini (1981) appear to have overlooked a footnote added by Uhlarik et 
al. (1977) suggesting that explanations in terms of cognitive factors do not 
exclude nor are incompatible with neurophysiological descriptions. 
Broerse and Crassini (1981) nonetheless reject all cognitive interpretations 
of colour contingent aftereffects (CCAEs) and consider these explanations 
to be 'inadequate' and concluded that neurophysiological accounts are 
more 'parsimonious'. Whilst a neurophysiological explanation may be 
appropriate to account for CCAEs it is questionable whether only one 
explanation is tenable for every perceptual phenomenon. The most 
prominent alternative explanation of visual effects assumes the 
involvement of mental processes. 
3. The Cognitive Model: The Link Between Perceptual 
Effects and Mental Processes 
Perceptual Alternations  
The cognitive approach can account for the characteristics of 
ambiguous stimuli and the perceptual effects that are reported when this 
type of stimulus is used. An ambiguous stimulus is one that, although 
physically stable, can be perceived in more than one way. When there is a 
perceived change from one version of the stimulus to the other a 
perceptual alternation occurs. A well known ambiguous picture is the 
rabbit/duck which can be seen as either a rabbit, on the left, or a duck on 
the right (Figure la). The most common types of ambiguous figures in 
vision research include figure ground ambiguity (Maltese Cross, Figure 
lb), and perspective ambiguity (Necker cube, Figure lc). 
According to a cognitive model perceptual alternations depend on two 
logically separable processes. They may be attributed to a 'cyclic decision 
process' (Vickers, 1972), or a process of continuous trial-and-error on the 
part of the perceptual system (Rock, 1975). 
a 
• Figure 1. Examples of (a) ambiguous pictures, co) figure-ground reversals, and (c) 
perspective reversals. 
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Cyclic Decision Model  
Vickers (1972) concluded that simple judgements such as would 
be involved in indicating the longer of two lines, seem to be mediated by a 
decision process. He argued that the process underlying any perceptual 
discrimination involves the accumulation of evidence from a series of 
inspections until some criterion is reached. This process recommences 
each time a decision is reached. When viewing any potentially ambiguous 
stimulus one percept will be periodically replaced by another when the 
decision process produces a different result. 
Trial-and-Error  
Rock (1975) conceptualised the alternating perceptions of the 
reversible figure as reflecting an active though non conscious trial-and-
error problem solving process within the visual system. He proposed that 
as the two possible solutions of the reversible figure are essentially 
equivalent, the governing decision process oscillates between the two, 
effectively replacing one alternative with the other equally acceptable 
alternative. 
These two explanations reflect the activity of spontaneous, 
generally active processes and conceptualises perceptual reversals as 
alternating solutions. Studies in support of the cognitive viewpoint have 
also shown that subjects not only are able to control the reversibility of 
ambiguous figures but also that the knowledge of reversibility, if 
withheld, affects the observers ability to perceive the alternative view of 
the stimulus (Girgus, Rock & Egatz, 1977; Reisberg & O'Shaughnessy, 
1984). 
Reversal Rate  
One commonly reported finding is that perceptual reversals tend to 
occur more rapidly over an extended viewing period (Brown, 1955; 
Cohen, 1959; Long, Toppino & Kostenbauder, 1983; Price, 1967a, 
1967b). From a cognitive viewpoint, the increase in reversals is attributed 
to the learning of alternate percepts, resulting in a shortening of the 
decision cycle. Further support for this approach is provided by the 
asymptotic curve depicting the number of reversals as a function of 
viewing time which is assumed to reflect a standard learning curve. 
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Relative Dominance  
A widely reported phenomenon of reversible figures is the 
reduction of dominance of a percept after prolonged exposure to an 
unambiguous stimulus. Typically the percept which resembles the 
unambiguous stimulus is seen for a smaller proportion of the subsequent 
viewing period (Carlson, 1953; Hochberg, 1950; Virsu, 1975; Von 
Grunau, Wiggin & Reed, 1984). This affect is generally attributed to the 
fatigue of neurophysiological mechanisms. 
Harris (1980), however, proposed that one of the effects of 
prolonged viewing or adaptation may be to shift the rate of accumulation 
of evidence for a particular perspective interpretation. Within this 
cognitive context one might speculate that prolonged inspection of an 
unambiguous stimulus simply creates a preference for whichever 
interpretation of the ambiguous stimulus is the more novel. 
Colour Contingent Aftereffects  
Ambiguous stimuli have also been incorporated into studies of 
colour contingent aftereffects including the McCollough effect (ME) 
(Uhlarik, Pringle 8z. Brigell, 1977). Jenkins and Ross (1977) found that 
the ME was contingent on subjective changes in the organisation of a test 
pattern. As the organisation of the test pattern was consciously changed 
from one state to the other, the colour aftereffect switched in and out. 
Unlike the standard test pattern to measure the ME, Jenkins and Ross 
(1977) used a test figure with no contours separating regions of vertical 
and horizontal gratings. This figure could be seen as a set of concentric 
square 'channels' or as four large triangles converging to a point in the 
centre of the pattern (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. The pattern developed by Jenkins and Ross (1977) and used to 
test for the McCollough effect. 
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The ME was generated with vertical green and horizontal red 
gratings or the reverse. When the test pattern appeared as separate 
triangular regions the ME was observed with white stripes tinted with the 
hue complementary to that of the induction grating of the same orientation. 
When the pattern appeared as concentric square 'channels' and regionless, 
the McCollough hues faded. Thus when the switch occurred even though 
the same physical edges were present the ME diminished, a finding not 
consistent with a neurophysiological account of the effect. 
The alternative explanation of the standard ME proposes an 
underlying cognitive process in which the pairing of a colour with a 
specific grid orientation comes to evoke a learned response in the visual 
system to the colour. Specifically, the red horizontal produces adaptation 
for red in conjunction with horizontal lines, so that after a number of 
pairings the line grid alone evokes the adaptive response (Murch, 1972). 
According to this approach mental processes are implicated, in which 
learning is assumed to have taken place. 
Explanations of CCAEs as a learning process or conditioned 
response has met with much resistance from proponents of the 
neurophysiological approach. This shows no sign of relenting if recent 
studies of the ME, arguing in favour of this viewpoint are any indication 
(Savoy & Gabrieli, 1991; Bedford & Reinke, 1993). 
The extreme application of researchers favouring the cognitive 
position was recently demonstrated by Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) who 
repeated an experiment by Hochberg (1950). Hochberg introduced the 
duration of the percepts of an ambiguous stimulus, a Maltese Cross (see 
Figure 1), as an indicator of neural fatigue. He found that after adaptation 
to the unambiguous stimulus that the first percept that was experienced in 
the test phase was the non inspected alternative. He also found that this 
percept that was reported for a longer duration than the other. This was 
taken as evidence that adaptation had resulted in neural fatigue. Using a 
figure ground reversible pattern of their own design Horlitz and O'Leary 
(1993) found that after adaptation to the unambiguous stimulus that each 
percept in the test phase was viewed for approximately fifty percent of the 
viewing period. Based on the assumption that all reversible figure 
phenomena can only be accounted for by cognitive processes, non 
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confirmation of Hochbergs finding was automatically accepted as 
evidence favouring the cognitive viewpoint. 
Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) also speculated that a preference for 
novelty or a process of habituation may account for many of the 
phenomena of reversible figures including the duration of percepts, the 
acceleration of reversals and relative dominance changes. According to 
this position relative dominance changes occur when an unambiguous 
stimulus is viewed because the more novel alternative percept is preferred 
in the ambiguous test stimulus. They additionally claimed that habituation 
in vision: "is not a process that is color-specific... .or location-
specific...." (p.680). No reason is given for this caveat and they appear 
not to have taken the evidence into account. For example studies have 
shown change in relative dominance to be colour contingent (e.g., 
Hochberg, 1950; Mapperson & Lovegrove,1989). Further, since location 
constancy is known to be acquired in infancy (see Keating & 
McKenzie,1986), it is unclear why Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) would 
assume that visual effects would not habituated to location. 
Location specificity was demonstrated in one of a series of 
experiments by Von Grunau et al. (1984) relative dominance changes 
were measured when an adaptation stimulus was presented in 0.5 degree 
steps above and below a centrally fixated test stimulus. At 1.5 degrees 
above and below the fixation point no significant change in relative 
dominance was reported. Von Grunau et al. (1984) interpreted this from 
the neurophysiological perspective concluding that the experiment had 
demonstrated the activity of retinally localised 'channels' for perspective 
orientation. Although Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) cite Von Grunau et 
al.'s (1984) study they appear to have overlooked the findings of this 
experiment. 
4. A Multi Level Model 
An additional theoretical position holds that a phenomenon may be 
attributed to multiple causes. As long ago as 1897 Chamberlain suggested 
that the scientific research of his era had become biased in favour of the 
theoretical perspective of the researcher. He warned that if this approach 
is adhered to researchers would ultimately shape their findings to confirm 
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the theory. Instead of a singular approach, with one hypothesis, 
Chamberlain proposed multiple hypothesis testing which puts forward 
and develops every tenable hypothesis. 
According to the literature it would appear that vision research has 
developed through single hypothesis testing with a bias in favour of 
singular accounts of visual phenomena. The equally likely possibility that 
multiple factors may contribute to a phenomenon has been overlooked in 
most cases in favour of more 'parsimonious' explanations. A reductionist 
approach, as this has inadvertently become, may be unnecessary. Three 
phenomena the MAE, ME and relative dominance changes provide 
evidence for a multiple factor approach. Evidence drawn from both major 
theoretical perspectives demonstrate this position. 
The Motion Aftereffect 
The MAE is generally believed to be attributed to the fatigue of 
directionally sensitive cells (Barlow & Hill, 1963; Favreau & Corballis, 
1976; Sekuler & Ganz, 1963; Sutherland, 1961). However mental 
processes have also been shown to influence this effect. Meyer and 
Sherman (1981) found that by 'effort of will' subjects were able to alter 
the magnitude of the aftereffect. 
The McCollough Effect 
The widely accepted explanation of the ME postulates that it may 
be attributed to adaptation or fatigue of neural structures that are feature 
specific (McCollough, 1965). The experiments of Jenkins and Ross 
(1977) reviewed previously, however, argue that the effect can be 
produced and controlled by mental processes. 
Relative Dominance  
Several studies have shown that change in relative dominance, 
under certain conditions (e.g., in monocular rivalry when one eye views 
alternating patterns), may at least partially be attributed to 
neurophysiological mechanisms. Harris (1980) however provided an 
equally plausible account of the effect in terms of cognitive factors. 
Clearly, neither model can provide a complete explanation of these 
three effects and a finding in favour of one position does not necessarily 
preclude, or is incompatible with any other position. In the case of the 
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MAE, ME, and relative dominance any explanation must consider that, in 
addition to sensory input, cognitive factors have been shown to influence 
both the nature and extent of the processing of visual information. 
5. A Two Stage Account 
Based on the discovery that information transfer in the human 
visual system is multidirectional one further approach to vision research 
has developed. This '2 stage' or information processing account of 
perceptual phenomena argues against models of perception being 
exclusively in favour of either of the two major theoretical viewpoints 
(Chaundhuri, 1990; Mapperson & Lovegrove, 1984). According to this 
approach information transfers from higher levels to influence the first 
steps in visual processing (top-down) or from lower sensory levels to 
higher cognitive levels (bottom-up). 
Top-down 
Recently the MAE has been discussed in terms of cognitive 
(attentive) processes to account for a 'bottom-up' model of information 
processing in which input from sensory mechanisms influences cognitive 
processes. Braddick (1990) and Chaundhuri (1990) found that the MAE 
could be considerably reduced in duration when an observer was 
attending to another task. This finding in addition to the 
neurophysiological explanation of the MAE was taken as support for the 
'top down' model of information processing in which input from 
cognitive mechanisms influences low level sensory mechanisms. 
Oottom-up  
Research findings have also reported the compatibility of the 
neurophysiological and cognitive approaches to account for a bottom-up 
model of information processing in which input from sensory 
mechanisms influences cognitive processes. For example Long, Toppino 
and Kostenbauder (1983) explain the switching of the percepts of an 
ambiguous stimulus, as a cognitive phenomenon and the reduction in 
dominance as due to the fatigue of the neurophysiological mechanisms. A 
similar account of the perceptual alternations and relative dominance 
changes of monocular rivalry, was put forward by Mapperson and 
Lovegrove (1984). 
13 
6. The Interpretation Dilemma and the Adaptation Paradigm 
Sections 2 to 5 have outlined several theoretical positions currently 
adopted in vision research. With such varying viewpoints a rift has 
developed between researchers concerning the 'ownership' of some 
phenomena (e.g., reversal rate, relative dominance). In an attempt to 
determine which theoretical approach to accept, some researchers have 
looked to the experimental paradigms for answers (Long, 1988; Porac, 
1989). The numerous theoretical accounts of perceptual alternations 
illustrates the dilemma. 
Perceptual Alternations  
An alternative to the cognitive account of perceptual alternations 
argues that any potentially ambiguous stimulus excites different sets of 
cells corresponding to different percepts, and that only the percept 
corresponding to the most active groups will be experienced (e.g., 
Kohler, 1940; McDougall, 1906; Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963). This 
group of cells will become fatigued and their firing rate will decrease until 
some critical level is reached. At this critical level an unfatigued set of 
cells corresponding to an alternative percept will take over. This set will 
in turn become fatigued (while the original set recovers) until a further 
alternation occurs. This neural fatigue explanation reflects the activity of a 
passive process in which the stimuli share common physical features. 
Under certain conditions this interpretation appears to be justified. 
Monocular and Binocular Rivalry 
This explanation may be valid when a pattern of crossed gratings 
is perceived as alternating monocularly or binocularly. In the case of 
binocular rivalry it is known that the inspection of a single grating will 
reduce the dominance of a later grating only when the gratings are similar 
in both orientation and spatial frequency (Blake & Overton, 1979). 
Reversal Rate of Ambiguous Stimuli  
According to the neurophysiological model the increase in 
reversals over time, that occurs during the prolonged viewing of an 
ambiguous stimulus, is due to the build up of residual fatigue in 
channels/neurones that do not fully recover. The result of this fatigue is 
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an increasingly shorter time between reversals. However not all 
phenomena can be explained on this basis. 
A review of numerous studies by Long (1988) revealed that 
proponents of both major theoretical positions based many of their 
findings on identical experimental procedures. Closer inspection of the 
paradigm and its use may demonstrate how multiple interpretations have 
been generated. 
Selective-Adaptation and Relative Dominance 
During the adaptation period of the selective-adaptation paradigm 
an unambiguous inspection figure is viewed for a period of two to three 
minutes. This is followed by an ambiguous test figure which shares 
certain features with the adaptation figure. Most frequently, any percept 
that resembles the unambiguous stimulus in the test phase becomes less 
dominant, that is it is seen for a smaller proportion of the viewing period. 
Thus the effect of adaptation changes the relative dominance of the 
percepts. 
The Neurophysiological Approach 
The neurophysiological approach necessitates that the adapting and 
test stimuli have features in common such as perspective orientation or 
colour. Adaptation effects have nevertheless been reported with stimuli 
that were in many aspects not similar to the test stimulus. Von Grunau, 
Wiggin and Reed (1984), in an attempt to provide evidence for channels 
for perspective orientation, adapted subjects to black/white photographs of 
a wooden box, positioned and illuminated to emphasize two perspective 
orientations (pointing up or down). Observers reported that the test 
stimulus (a line drawing of an ambiguous Necker cube) appeared for a 
longer time in the orientation opposite to the one experienced during 
adaptation. As they noted "it is remarkable that adaptation effects 
occurred with stimuli that were in many basic aspects not similar to the 
test stimulus, that is in contrast, orientation and presence of 
contours"(p.321). 
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Transfer-of-Decrement and the Muller-Lyer Illusion  
The adaptation paradigm is refered to by proponents of the 
cognitive approach as transfer-of-decrement. Transfer-of-decrement 
therefore indicates that there is a decrease in the magnitude of an illusion 
that occurs within a prolonged inspection period. This is demonstrated 
most often using the Muller-Lyer figure. 
Learning (Cognitive) Approach 
Observers' measured illusion magnitudes decrease if they scan the 
Muller-Lyer stimulus for a short time. Five minutes of inspection of the 
standard Muller-Lyer figure invariably produces reductions in the original 
illusion magnitude estimation. 
Illusion decrement has also been found to respond to traditional 
learning variables. For example massed as compared to spaced intervals 
of viewing produces illusion decrement (Dewar, 1968). Further, subjects 
asked to estimate the magnitude of the Muller-Lyer figure days or weeks 
after adaptation retain the previously learned underestimation (Girgus, 
Corm, Durant & Porac, 1975). 
A further observation is that illusion reduction depends on the 
judged similarity between the adapting and test figures. Coren andGirgus 
(1974) showed that transfer of decrement in the Muller-Lyer figure varied 
as a function of perceptual similarity. Observers viewed the classic form 
of the Muller-Lyer illusion for 5 minutes to induce illusion decrement. 
They tested whether the decrement tranferred to other variants of the 
illusion, all of which had been rated for their similarity to the standard 
form. They reported that there was transfer to the other configurations, 
with the figures that had been rated most similar to the inspection figure 
showing the largest effects and those that were most dissimilar showing 
the least transfer. These findings indicate the involvement of learning in 
illusion reduction. Adequate explanation concerning precisely how 
perceptual judgements of similarity are made and how learning takes place 
are not provided in the literature. 
As the explanations of these phenomena show, the adaptation 
paradigm can be used to provide evidence in favour of either of the two 
major theoretical positions: a neurophysiological account of relative 
dominance and a cognitive account of the Muller-Lyer illusion. Adopting 
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this experimental approach has also resulted in some researchers, even 
when faced with 'remarkable' findings that do conform with the 
commonly reported data, to conclude in favour of an assumed theory 
(Von Grunau et al., 1984). 
The continued application of this paradigm unfortunately maintains 
the dichotomy of approaches to vision research according to which a 
finding excluding one approach automatically provides evidence in favour 
of the other. 
7. The Dichotomous Approach: Some Conclusions 
The preceding discussion has provided a brief overview of the 
status of vision research with particular emphasis on the various 
interpretations of the characteristics of perceptual alternations. The search 
for explanations of some perceptual phenomena has unfortunately lead to 
a situation in which the conflict has come to embody a debate between 
researchers who hold dichotomous viewpoints. For example Broerse and 
Crassini (1981) explain all complex perceptual effects in terms of one 
neurophysiological mechanism or process at the exclusion of any other 
explanation. Other perception reseachers adopt an exclusively cognitive 
interpretation of all phenomena (Horlitz & O'Leary, 1993). One notable 
consequence of this conflict is an impasse in the intepretation of visual 
effects produced by ambiguous stimuli. 
Much of the impasse may be due to the nature of the evidence that 
supports the two major theoretical positions. On the one hand is the 
neurophysiological or 'hard evidence' e.g., psychophysiological 
recordings of cell activity. On the other is cognitive evidence which by its 
nature is largely subjective. For example in the case of the ME cognitive 
influence is demonstrated by an observers ability to consciously switch 
the organisation of the test stimulus and cause the hues to fade. Criticisms 
of the cognitive approach based on the absence of parametric measures, 
data and statistical analyses would appear warranted. Criticism however 
based on any alternative explanation being more 'parsimonious' is 
unfounded. 
The dominance of the neurophysiological model led Harris (1980) 
to draw attention to the extreme application of the approach by advocating 
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the existence of yellow volkswagon detectors to explain how we perceive 
yellow volkswagons. A continuation of this approach is apparent with 
Von Grunau et al's (1984) proposal of channels for perspective 
orientation to account for the perception of boxes. 
The two major theoretical approaches in vision reseach have 
developed valid theoretical acounts of many perceptual phenomena. 
Generally researchers have adopted the singular hypothesis testing 
approach with proponents of these dichotomous approaches believing that 
perceptual effects can be adequately explained by one theory and without 
rational consideration of any alternative explanations. 
As there is clearly evidence for both theoretical approaches and 
both are able to explain the same phenomena, e.g., reversal rate of 
perceptual alternations, an integrated approach, in which visual processing 
at a physiological level is influenced by cognitive process, appears to be 
warranted. 
8. Directions For Further Research 
Long (1988) noted that the one experimental paradigm adopted by 
the proponents of both major theoretical approaches is unable to verify or 
falsify either position. Clearly the adaptation paradigm has enhanced the 
difficulty of interpretation for some researchers. In the case of relative 
dominance changes there appears to be little consensus of interpretation. 
Additionally researchers have attempted to provide evidence to 
support a single hypothesis. For example Von Grunau et al's (1984) 
experiment, in which the adapting stimulus was placed in varying 
locations above and below the test stimulus, was based on the hypothesis 
that only neurophysiological mechanisms account for changes in relative 
dominance. This experiment was undertaken without considering that 
changing the perceived location of the stimulus would have an impact on 
the experimental outcome. Close inspection of Von Grunau et al.'s 
(1984) findings show that it was only in one condition, when the adapting 
and test stimuli were both centrally located and fixated, that the stimuli 
occupied the same retinal and physical location. Further it was in this 
condition that the largest adaptation effects were reported. On the basis of 
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Von Grunau et al.'s (1984) interpretation of localised channels for 
perspective orientation and an examination of their findings several 
hypotheses can be made. 
Hypotheses and Experimental Strategy 
Three experiments are proposed to investigate whether Von 
Grunau et al.'s (1984) interpretation of relative dominance changes in 
terms of localised channels for perspective orientation is appropriate or 
whether a cognitive account may be more valid. As will be recalled, 
cognitive explanations in terms of habituation (Horlitz & O'Leary, 1993) 
assume that learning of the unambiguous percept occurs in the adaptation 
phase. When the ambiguous test stimulus is subsequently viewed a 
preference is created for the unlearned and more novel alternative percept. 
Further, if the adaptation effect is location dependent this would account 
for the diminished effect reported by Von Grunau et al. (1984) when the 
adapting stimulus was moved away from the test stimulus. 
The first experiment hypothesises that if only localised channels 
are involved then the magnitude of the change would be expected to be the 
same irrespective of whether the adapting and test stimuli are in the same 
perceived positions. • Conversely if relative dominance can be attributed to 
factors under cognitive influence such as location, then it is also 
hypothesised that the magnitude of the change will be significantly 
different when the perceived (or spatiotopic) location of the stimulus is 
manipulated, irrespective of the retinal (or retinotopic) location. 
Von Grunau et al's (1984) interpretation can be evaluated in the 
first experiment if an eye movement is introduced in the adaptation/test 
paradigm between the adapting and test periods when the test stimulus is 
located below the adapting stimulus. When the observer changes fixation 
from the centre of the adapting stimulus to the centre of the test stimulus it 
can then be ensured that the stimuli will fall on the same retinal area even 
though the perceived locations differ. This condition in addition to one 
used by Von Grunau et al. (1984) with retinally and spatially coincident 
stimuli tests the hypothesis that only localised channels are involved in 
relative dominance changes. If this is correct there will be no difference in 
the adaptation effect when the physical location is changed in the eye 
movement condition. 
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Further, if relative dominance changes can be attributed to factors 
under cognitive influence then it is hypothesised that the magnitude of the 
change will be significantly different when the perceived location of the 
stimuli is manipulated, irrespective of the retinal location. In this 
experiment an eye movement will be made between the adapting and test 
period. When the observer changes fixation from below the adapting 
stimulus to the centre of the test figure it can then be ensured that the 
stimuli occupy different retinal locations when the perceived location 
remains the same. This condition in addition to one used by Von Grunau 
et al (1984) with stimuli that were neither retinally nor spatially coincident 
tests the hypothesis that cognitive factors such as location may be involved 
in relative dominance changes. It is expected that there will be a 
significant difference in the adaptation effect when the physical location is 
changed, even though the retinal location differs in both conditions. 
A third experiment proposes that if relative dominance is 
dependent upon location, then a more appropriate explanation may be in 
terms of a cognitive or learning process such as habituation. In this 
experiment the adapting and test stimulus occupy the same physical 
location. When the observer changes fixation from below the adapting 
stimulus to the centre of the test stimulus this ensures that the test stimulus 
occupies a different retinal location. Because of the established 
phenomenon of dishabituation (Thomson & Spencer, 1966) it is 
hypothesised that if a novel stimulus is presented before the test stimulus 
there will be an increase in reporting the adapted percept. It is also 
hypothesised that when this stimulus is presented on the next trial that it 
will have little effect on the observers' reporting of the adapted percept 
indicating that learning of the novel stimulus occurred on the first 
presentation. Further, as the stimuli in this experiment are in different 
retinal locations, any change in relative dominance can only be attributed 
to cognitive factors and not neurophysiological mechanisms such as 
localised channels. 
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Abstract 
A widely reported phenomenon of reversible figures is the reduction in 
dominance of a percept after exposure to an unambiguous stimulus. Von 
Grunau, Wiggin and Reed (1984) measured relative dominance changes 
when an adaptation stimulus was placed above and below a test stimulus. 
The adaptation effect diminished at 1.5 degrees from the test stimulus and 
it was proposed that reduction in dominance may be attributed to retinally 
localised channels for perspective orientation. In this study however it 
was taken for granted that only the retinal position of the stimulus was 
important. They were unaware that changing the position of the adapting 
stimulus manipulated both the retinal and the perceived location. 
The present study hypothesises that if only localised channels are involved 
in relative dominance changes then the magnitude of the change would be 
expected to be the same irrespective of whether the stimuli are in the same 
perceived positions. Conversely if relative dominance can be attributed to 
factors under cognitive influence, such as location, then it is also 
hypothesised that the magnitude of the change will be significantly 
different when the perceived location of the stimulus is manipulated, 
irrespective of the retinal location. 
Von Grunau et al.'s (1984) interpretation of relative dominance changes 
was evaluated in experiment 1 with the introduction of an eye movement 
between the adapting and test periods. It was then ensured that the stimuli 
will fall on the same retinal area even though the perceived locations 
differ. Further, in experiment 2 an eye movement to a different location 
ensured that the stimuli occupied different retinal locations when the 
perceived location remains the same. 
Experiment 1 showed negligible reduction in dominance when the 
perceived location differed although the retinal location remained constant, 
a finding contrary to that predicted by Von Grunau et al. (1984). 
Experiment 2 showed a large reduction in dominance when the perceived 
location remained the same and the retinal location differed. This was 
taken to demonstrate that the effect was dependent on the coincidence of 
perceived location. 
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It was further hypothesised that if relative dominance changes could be 
accounted for by a cognitive process, such as habituation, then a 
phenomenon such as dishabituation may be demonstrated. Support for 
this hypothesis was provided in experiment 3. The wider implications of 
the procedure utilised in this study were discussed. 
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Ambiguous figures are a class of visual illusions that appear to 
change abruptly and spontaneously, even though the physical stimulus 
remains unaltered. Perhaps the best known example is the Necker cube 
(after Necker, 1832) which is illustrated in Figure 1, with the two 
alternate percepts. These changes, or 'perceptual alternations', have been 
explained by two competing approaches to visual perception: the 
neurophysiological model and the cognitive model. 
The neurophysiological model proposes that any potentially 
ambiguous stimulus excites different sets of cells which correspond to 
different percepts, and that only the percept corresponding to the most 
active group will be experienced (e.g., Orbach, Ehrlich & Heath, 1963; 
Brigner & Deni, 1992). This group of cells will become fatigued and 
their firing rate will decrease until some critical level is reached. At this 
critical level an unfatigued set of cells corresponding to an alternative 
percept will take over. This set will in turn become fatigued (while the 
original set recovers) until a further alternation occurs. 
The cognitive model proposes that alternations are the result of a 
mental process which periodically switches between different 
interpretations of the stimulus (e.g., Gregory, 1966; Liebert & Burk, 
1985; Rock & Mitchener, 1991). For example in Vickers' (1972) model, 
the initial emergence of any percept is the result of an accumulation of 
evidence from a series of inspections until some criterion is reached and a 
decision is made. Vickers (1972) proposes that this process is cyclic, 
recommencing automatically each time a decision is made. In the case of a 
potentially ambiguous stimulus, this will result in periodic changes in the 
percept when different decisions are reached on successive cycles. 
Following Hubel and Wiesel's (1959,1962) findings on the 
neurophysiology of the visual system, the neurophysiological approach 
has tended to become dominant in studies of visual perception. 
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A 
Figure 1. An ambiguous Necker cube (A) and the two alternate percepts (B) 
'down', and (C) 'up'. 
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Although both the neurophysiological and cognitive explanations account 
equally well for many characteristics of perceptual alternations, there is a 
growing body of evidence that supports cognitive involvement in visual 
perception which has left some researchers irresolute as to the most 
adequate explanation. For example, Long and Toppino (1981) initially 
proposed a very specific physiological account of perceptual alternations. 
They later proposed a model incorporating elements of both views (Long, 
Toppino & Kostenbauder, 1983). In a later study they reverted to an 
exclusively physiological explanation of these phenomena (Toppino & 
Long, 1987). 
Subsequently Long (1988) has recognised that the paradigm used 
in his experiments did not in itself allow discrimination between the two 
approaches. The commonly adopted procedure is variously termed the 
selective adaptation paradigm by neurophysiological proponents or 
transfer-of -decrement by proponents of the cognitive approach. During 
the adaptation period an unambiguous inspection figure is viewed for a 
period of 2 to 3 minutes. This is followed by a test figure which shares 
certain features with the adapting figure. 
One special case of perceptual alternations demonstrates the 
paradigm. A widely reported phenomenon of reversible figures is the 
reduction in dominance of a percept after exposure to an unambiguous 
stimulus (e.g., Carlson, 1953; Harris, 1980; Mapperson & Lovegrove, 
1978, 1989; Virsu, 1975; Von Grunau, Wiggin & Reed, 1984). 
Typically, the percept which resembles the unambiguous stimulus is seen 
for a smaller portion of the subsequent viewing period. This 'adaptation 
effect', according to the neurophysiological model, is the result of the 
unambiguous stimulus exciting one set of cells which fatigue over 
prolonged viewing. Thus, during the subsequent viewing of an 
ambiguous stimulus, the unfatigued set of cells predominates until the 
fatigued set recovers. This neurophysiological account only valid when 
the features of the adapting and test stimuli are similar. Adaptation effects 
have nevertheless been reported with stimuli that were in many aspects not 
similar to the test stimulus. 
When adaptation to a Necker cube occurs with an unambiguous 
stimulus the ambiguous test figure is seen for a much larger proportion of 
time to be in the opposite orientation to adaptation figure. Von Grunau et 
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al. (1984) conducted several experiments in which such results were 
reported. 
Observers were adapted with either an unambiguous line drawing 
of a Necker cube or a pair of black/white photographs of a wooden box. 
These were positioned and illuminated in such a way as to emphasise the 
two perspective orientations used previously. The test stimulus was an 
ambiguous outline drawing of a Necker cube. The effects of adaptation 
using photographs of boxes were similar that obtained for the outline 
drawings. They noted that "It is remarkable that the same adaptation 
effects occured with stimuli that were in many basic aspects not similar to 
the test stimulus, that is in contrast, orientation and the presence of 
contours" (p.321). On the basis of this result they postulated the existence 
of channels for perspective orientation. 
In another experiment Von Grunau et al. (1984) measured relative 
dominance changes when an adaptation stimulus, an unambiguous line 
drawing of a Necker cube, was placed in 0.5 degree steps above and 
below a centrally fixated test stimulus (a line drawing of an ambiguous 
Necker cube). At 1.5 degrees above and below the fixation point no 
significant change in relative dominance was reported. This was taken as 
evidence for channels for perspective orientation which are retinally 
localised, since the changes did not occur when the adapting stimulus was 
moved further than 1.5 degrees away from the test stimulus. Aside from 
being unsubstantiated by physiological evidence, it is difficult to conceive 
of the receptive field structure necessitated by this conclusion. 
In the case of the adaptation effect, only two publications (Harris, 
1980; Horlitz & O'Leary, 1993) suggest explanations other than neural 
fatigue. Harris (1980) proposed that: "one of the effects of adaptation 
may be to shift the criterion or rate of accumulation of evidence for a 
particular perspective interpretation" (pp. 455-456). More recently Horlitz 
and O'Leary (1993) suggested that a preference for novelty or a process 
of habituation may account for many of the phenomena of reversible 
figures including relative dominance. According to this position when an 
unambiguous stimulus is viewed the more novel alternative percept will be 
preferred in the ambiguous test stimulus. In the light of these suggestions 
Von Grunau et al.'s (1984) procedure requires examination. 
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In their experiments, it was taken for granted that a 
neurophysiological process was involved and hence that only the retinal 
position of the stimulus was important. Von Grunau et al. (1984) were 
unaware that changing the position of the adapting stimulus manipulated 
the retinal and the perceived location of the stimulus. Further it was only 
in one condition/position, when the adapting and test stimuli were both 
centrally located and fixated, that they occupied the same retinal and 
physical location. In this condition the largest adaptation effects were 
reported. As the adapting stimulus was moved away from the test 
stimulus the adaptation effect diminished. 
Relative dominance may be due to habituation as Horlitz and 
O'Leary (1993) suggested. Habituation assumes that learning of the 
unambiguous percept occurs in the adaptation phase. When the 
ambiguous test stimulus is subsequently viewed a preference is created for 
the unlearned and more novel alternative percept. To account for the 
diminished adaptation effect as the stimulus was moved (Von Grunau et 
al., 1984), it may be that habituation or learning is dependent upon 
perceived location rather than retinal location. 
Based on Von Grunau et al's (1984) findings and Horlitz and 
O'Leary's (1993 ) suggestions several hypotheses can be made. Firstly, 
if only retinal channels are involved in change in dominance then the 
magnitude of the change would be expected to be the same irrespective of 
whether the stimuli are in the same perceived positions. Von Grunau et 
al.'s (1984) interpretation can be evaluated if an eye movement is 
introduced in the adaptation/test paradigm between the adapting and test 
periods. It can then be ensured that the stimuli will fall on the same retinal 
area even though perceived locations differ. This condition in addition to 
one used by Von Grunau et al. (1984) in which the largest changes in 
relative dominance changes were reported, when the stimuli were retinally 
and spatially coincident, tests the first hypothesis in experiment 1. If this 
hypothesis is correct there will be no difference in the adaptation effect 
when physical location is changed in the eye movement condition. 
If relative dominance changes can be attributed to factors under 
cognitive influence then the magnitude of the change will be significantly 
different when the perceived location of the stimuli is manipulated, 
irrespective of the retinal location. Therefore an eye movement between 
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the adapting and test period to a different location can ensure that the 
stimuli occupy different retinal locations when the perceived location 
remains the same. This condition in addition to one used by Von Grunau 
et al. (1984), in which no change in relative dominance was reported, 
when the stimuli were neither retinally nor spatially coincident, tests this 
hypothesis in experiment 2. It is expected that there will be a significant 
difference in the adaptation effect when the physical location is changed, 
eventhough the retinal location differs in both conditions. 
Experiment 3 tests the hypothesis that if relative dominance 
changes can be accounted for by a cognitive process, such as habituation, 
then dishabituation may be demonstrated. This hypothesis predicts that 
learning (or habituation) of the adapted percept during adaptation will be 
interrupted when a novel stimulus is introduced, resulting in 
dishabituation. It is predicted that presentation of a novel stimulus will 
result in the recommencement of learning shown as a significant increase 
in the reporting of the adapted percept.when the test stimulus is presented. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty first year Psychology students participated as part of 
course requirements. 
Apparatus and Materials  
Computer generated black and white line drawings of a Necker 
cube subtending a visual angle of 2 degrees, with an average luminance of 
6 cd/m2 and a contrast of 0.6 were presented in a Scientific Prototype 
tachistoscope. Following Brigner and Harris (1989), the front faces of 
the two alternative percepts of the standard ambiguous Necker cube (used 
as test stimuli) were outlined in either green or red to facilitate reporting. 
These percepts were either green and down, or red and up. 
Of the two test stimuli, used for baseline and test measures, one 
was spatially coincident with the adapting stimulus and the other was 2 
degrees below the adapting stimulus. The adapting stimulus, shown in 
Figure 2, was an unambiguous line drawing of a Necker cube, 
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corresponding to the 'down' percept, as used by Von Grunau et al. 
(1984). Viewing was binocular throughout. Observers indicated which 
percept was dominant by depressing either of two buttons on a response 
pad that activated electronic timers. 
Figure 2. Unambiguous adapting stimulus corresponding to the 'down' 
percept of the Necker cube. 
Design 
This experiment was a within subjects repeated measures design. 
The independent variable was the perceived location of the stimuli. The 
dependent variable was the mean time in seconds that observers reported 
the 'down' percept' T tests were used to determine whether there was a 
significant difference in the change in 'down' percept when the perceived 
location of the stimulus was varied. 
Procedure  
Observers were familiarised with an ambiguous Necker cube. 
Whilst viewing the stimulus the two alternative percepts were described 
by the experimenter as being either a green box facing down and to the left 
or as a red box facing up and to the right. All subjects indicated that they 
could identify both Necker cube percepts. 
Six 30 second baseline measures were taken on each of the two 
ambiguous test figures with observers maintaining fixation on a central 
spot. These figures required observers to fixate either 'low' or 'high'. 
The low figure was located 2 degrees below the high figure. In the 
experimental condition fixation was either in the centre of the adapting 
figure or 2 degrees below. Observers were informed that an eye 
movement would be required between the adapting and test figures. 
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Adaptation initially occurred for 150 seconds to the unambiguous 
cube. This was followed by a test period of 30 seconds and readaptation 
of 45 seconds. Test and readaptation occurred until a total of six 30 
second measures were taken. The amount of 'down' percept was 
averaged for each subject for the two baseline and the two experimental 
conditions. 
In condition 1 the adapting and test stimuli occupied the same 
retinal and perceived location. Fixation in the centre of the adapting 
stimulus was maintained when the test stimulus was presented. In 
condition 2 the adapting and test stimuli occupied the same retinal but 
different perceived locations. An eye movement was required to the 
fixation point in centre of the test stimulus which was 2 degrees below the 
adapting stimulus. These two conditions are shown in Figure 3. 
 
High - 
 
Fixation 
 
Condition 1 
Condition 2 
 
LOw - 
 
Adapt 	 Test 
Stimulus 
Figure 3 Eye movements requried in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
The amount of 'down' percept was averaged for each subject for 
the two baseline and the two experimental conditions. For raw data see 
appendices A and B. The mean number of seconds that observers 
reported the 'down' percept in the baseline of condition I was 105.23, 
and the baseline of condition 2 was 108.97. The mean time in seconds 
observers reported the 'down' percept in condition 1 was 95.46 and in 
condition 2 was 106.2. 
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T tests showed a significant difference in the change in the'down' 
percept when the perceived location was varied (t=-4.9, p<0.01, 2-tailed). 
The reduction in 'down' percept from the averaged baseline of 
107.09 seconds was calculated as a percentage and is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Reduction from averaged baseline calculated as a percentage. 
The 10.8% reduction from baseline shown in condition 1, when 
the retinal and perceived positions were identical, was significant (t=3.3, 
p<0.01, 2-tailed). The 0.3% reduction in dominance when only the 
perceived location differed was non-significant (t=0.9, p>0.05, 2-tailed) 
Contrary to von Grunau et al.'s (1984) findings of a retinally 
localised effect, condition 2 in which the stimuli were retinally coincident 
but spatially noncoincident, showed a minimal effect. Reduction in 
dominance therefore may be dependent upon the coincidence of perceived 
location irrespective of retinal location. This prediction was tested in 
experiment 2. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
If relative dominance can be attributed to factors under cognitive 
influence then it is prediced the magnitude of the change will be 
significantly different when the perceived location of the stimuli is 
manipulated when the retinal location of adaptation and test stimuli differ. 
An eye movement between the adapting and test period to a different 
location can ensure that the stimuli occupy different perceived locations 
whilst maintaining different retinal locations. This condition in addition to 
one used by Von Grunau et al (1984), in which no change in relative 
dominance was reported, when the stimuli were neither retinally nor 
spatially coincident, tests this hypothesis. 
Method 
Subjects  
Twenty first year Psychology students participated as part of 
course requirements. 
Apparatus and Materials  
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as used in experiment 1. 
Design  
This experiment was a within subjects repeated measures design. 
The independent variable was the perceived location of the stimuli. The 
dependent variable was the mean time in seconds that observers reported 
the 'down' percept'. T tests were used to determine whether there was a 
significant difference in the change in the 'down' percept when the retinal 
location of the stimulus was varied. 
Procedure 
The procedure used in experiment 1 was followed. In condition 1 
the adapting and test stimuli occupied different retinal but the same 
perceived location. Fixation was 2 degrees below the adapting stimulus. 
An eye movement was required to the centre of the test figure which was 
presented in the same location as the adapting stimulus. In condition 2 the 
adapting and test simuli differed in retinal and perceived location. 
Fixation was 2 degrees below the adapting stimulus. Fixation was 
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maintained when the test figure was presented in a different location to the 
adapting stimulus. The two conditions are outlined in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Eye movements required in Experiment 2. 
Results and Discussion 
The amount of 'down' percept was averaged for each subject for 
the two baseline and the two experimental conditions. For raw data see 
appendices C and D. The mean number of seconds that observers 
reported the 'down' percept in the baseline of condition 1 was 106.82, 
and in condition 2 was 107.89. The mean time in seconds that observers 
reported the 'down' percept in condition 1 was 93.31 and in condition 2 
was 104.91. 
T tests showed a significant difference in the change in the 'down' 
percept when the retinal location varied (t=-3.2, p<0.01, 2-tailed) The 
reduction from the averaged baseline of 107.35 was calculated as a 
percentage (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 . Reduction from averaged baseline calculated as a percentage. 
The 13.1% reduction from baseline shown in condition 1, when retinal 
positions differed and perceived positions were identical, was significant (t=3.2, 
p<0.01,2-tailed). The 2.3% change when both the retinal and perceived location 
differed was non-significant (t=0.8, p>0.05, 2-tailed). This confirms Von 
Grunau's finding of little or no adaptation effect when the adapting and test 
stimulus occupied different in retinal and perceived location. 
The finding of a large adaptation effect in condition 1 cannot be attributed 
to any known neurophysiological mechanisms or Von Grunau et al.'s (1984) 
hypothesised localised channels for perspective orientation. A third hypothesis 
based on an alternative explanation of relative dominance changes will be tested in 
experiment 3. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Recently Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) proposed that the underlying 
processes of reversible figures may be attributed to habituation or 
learning. To test this suggestion it may be predicted that some well 
established and unique characteristics of habituation should be 
reproducible in an adaptation test paradigm. 
One of the earliest attempts to distinguish the characteristics of 
habituation from neural fatigue was undertaken by Thomson and Spencer 
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(1966). They noted that the most widely reported phenomenon that 
distinguishes the two is 'dishabituation' which occurs when an 
unexpected stimulus is presented to an observer. In an adaptation 
paradigm, according to habituation theory, any learning of the percept 
during adaptation will be interrupted when a novel stimulus in introduced 
resulting in 'dishabituation'. However on subsequent presentations, as 
the novel stimulus becomes more familiar, its capacity to 'dishabituate' 
lessens. 
Adopting the adaptation test paradigm of experiments 1 and 2, it is 
hypothesised that the presentation of an unexpected stimulus (an electric 
bell) will show the dishabituation of the habituated response (i.e., an 
increase in the 'down' percept) on the first presentation. On the second 
presentation it is hypothesised that the bell will have little or no effect i.e, 
that there will be a recovery of the original habituated response. 
To test these hypotheses and to exclude interpretations of the 
outcome of this experiment in terms of retinally localised mechanisms, 
condition 1 of experiment 2 will be used. In this condition the adapting 
and test stimuli differ in retinal location but occupy the same perceived 
location. 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty first year psychology students participated as part of 
course requirements. 
Apparatus and Materials  
The apparatus and stimuli as for experiment 2 condition 1 were 
used. 
Design 
This experiment was a within subjects repeated measures design. 
The independent variable was the presentation of a bell as either 'early' or 
'late'. The bell was presented twice in each of the two sessions to assess 
whether the position of the bell influences the adaptation effect. The 
dependent variable was the mean time in seconds that observers reported 
the 'down' percept. Analysis of variance was used to determine whether 
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there was a significant difference in the change in the 'down' percept 
when the bell was sounded. 
Procedure  
The procedure for condition 1 of Experiment 2 was used except that 
a 2 second interstimulus (ISI) interval occurred between each adapting 
period and the following 30 second test period. Subjects participated in 
two sessions of 6_trials each commencing with six 30 second baseline 
measures. A bell was presented twice in each session. 
In one session a bell was firstly presented in the 1ST preceding the 
second trial and again in the ISI preceding the third trial. In the other 
session it was presented firstly in the ISI preceding the fifth trial and again 
in the ISI preceding the sixth trial. There was a 15 minute interval 
between sessions. The sessions were counterbalanced with half of the 
subjects receiving the bell early (on the second and third trials) and the 
other half receiving the bell late (on the fifth and sixth trials). 
An 88dB electric bell (intensity measured with a Dawes sound level 
meter) was demonstrated twice before commencing the experiment and the 
observers were informed that it would sound on several occasions during 
the experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean number of seconds for which observers reported the 
'down' percept in the six baseline and the six test trials for each session 
was calculated. For raw data see appendices El and E2 for baseline and 
appendix F for test trials. The mean baseline in the bell early session was 
13.817 seconds and 15.001 seconds in the bell late session. 
An ANOVA and paired comparisons using Newman Keuls were 
carried out on the test means. An ANOVA showed a significant 
interaction between the sessions and trials [F(5,95)=11.41, p<0.0000] 
indicating a significant difference in the observers reporting of the 'down' 
percept when the bell was presented. This indicates that any learning 
(habituation) of the adapted percept was interupted when the bell was 
introduced. This resulted in dishabituation and the recommencement of 
learning of both percepts when the ambiguous test stimulus was 
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presented. It can be concluded that the position of the bell did not affect 
the reporting of the 'down' percept as the presentation of the bell similarly 
effected reporting in both positions. 
The percentage change from baseline in the non-bell trials was 
calculated. In the bell early session on trials 1, 4, 5 and 6 the percentage 
change was 6.8, 2.0, 2.5, and 2.0. respectively. In the bell late session 
on trials 1, 2, 3 and 4 the percentage change was 4.5, 3.1, 3.6, and 3.0 
respectively. Post-hoc tests revealed that the 'down' percept on the first 
bell trial in each session was reported for significantly longer than on all 
other trials. No other differences were significant especially when the bell 
was presented for the second time i.e. between trials 2 and 3 in the bell 
early session and between trials 5 and 6 in the bell late session. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the percentage change from baseline 
in the two sessions. 
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Figure 7. The percentage change from baseline, bell early. 
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Figure 8. The percentage change from baseline, bell late. 
As predicted the initial bell trial in each session caused a significant 
increase in the amount of 'down' percept. In bell early session, in the trial 
before the first presentation of the bell, observers reported the 'down' 
percept for 14.75 seconds. This increased to 17.51 seconds when the bell 
was presented. In the bell late session observers reported the 'down' 
percept for 15.45 seconds in the trial before the first presentation of the 
bell. This increased to 16.67 seconds when the bell was presented for the 
first time The second presentation of the bell had little or no effect in both 
sessions with the amount of 'down' percept returning to the pre-bell level. 
Summary Of Findings and General Discussion 
Von Grunau et al. (1984) proposed that the reduction in 
dominance of a Necker cube percept after exposure to an unambiguous 
stimulus was due to retinally localised channels for perspective 
orientation. Experiment 1 in which the stimuli were retinally coincident 
but spatially non coincident produced negligible reduction in dominance. 
This finding refuted Von Grunau et al.'s (1984) interpretation of relative 
dominance changes and led to the proposal of an alternative explanation in 
cognitive terms. 
It was therefore proposed that changes in relative dominance may 
be dependent upon the coincidence of perceived position irrespective of 
the retinal location. This proposition was tested in experiment 2. 
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Experiment 2 reported a large adaptation effect when the stimuli were 
spatially coincident but differed in retinal location. Data from this 
experiment provided evidence for a cognitive explanation of relative 
dominance. This agrees with some researchers who propose that 
reversible figure phenomena may be attributed to non-neural mechanisms 
(Reisberg & O'Shaughnessy, 1984; Girgus, Rock & Egatz, 1977; Rock 
& Mitchener, 1991). Recently Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) suggested that 
a preference for novelty may account for many of the phenomena of 
reversible figures including the duration of percepts, acceleration and 
relative dominance. Experiment 3 demonstrated several characteristics of 
habituation including dishabituation. This was shown when the sound of 
a bell presented after adaptation caused an increase in the reporting of the 
'down' percept' when the test stimulus was presented. According to a 
neurophysiological explanation the bell should have had little if any effect 
on relative dominance. 
Under certain conditions however relative dominance changes can 
be accounted for in terms of the fatiguing of neurophysiological 
mechanisms. For example when using crossed gratings in studies of 
monocular and binocular rivalry (Blake & Overton, 1979; Mapperson & 
Lovegrove, 1978, 1989) it has been established that there are cells 
selective for orientation that fatigue after prolonged exposure (Blakemore, 
Carpenter & Georgeson, 1970). These various explanations show that 
habituation is not the only process that can account for relative dominance 
as Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) suggested. 
Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) additionally claimed that habituation in 
vision: "is not a process that is color-specific... .or location- 
specific... .".(p.680) and no reason is given for this caveat. Studies have 
however shown change in relative dominance to be colour contingent 
(e.g., Hochberg, 1950). Further, since location constancy is known to be 
acquired in infancy (see Keating & McKenzie, 1986), it is unclear why 
Horlitz and O'Leary (1993) would assume that visual effects would not 
habituated to location. Clearly experiment 2 demonstrated the location 
specificity of relative dominance changes. 
Collectively these three experiments contrast the alternative 
explanations of the relative dominance changes that occur when using 
ambiguous figures that reverse in perspective. It can be concluded 
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therefore, that in this case a cognitive interpretation of relative dominance 
may be more appropriate. 
Future Directions 
Researchers from both major theoretical perspectives have noted a 
dilemma concerning the interpretation of findings in vision research, and 
that typically the adaptation paradigm has been used to provide support for 
both positions (Long, 1988; Porac,1989). A modified strategy was 
successfully applied in this study in three experiments to independently 
manipulate the neurophysiological and cognitive components of changes 
in relative dominance. The methodology used in experiments 1 and 2 can 
be adapted to the investigation of other visual aftereffects for which the 
involvement of localised neurones has been claimed. Examples include 
the size aftereffect (Blakemore & Sutton, 1969), colour contingent 
aftereffects (Stromeyer, 1972 a,1972 b.) and the motion aftereffect 
(Masland, 1969). 
Using the experimental design that was subsequently adopted by 
Von Grunau et al. (1984), Masland (1969) investigated the location 
specificity of the motion aftereffect by positioning a moving adapting 
stimulus in 0.5 degree steps above and below a stationary test stimulus. 
The largest effects were found at 1.5 degrees above and below the test 
stimulus. Masland (1969) claimed the localised nature of the motion 
aftereffect without realising that the physical and the retinal location of the 
stimuli were varied. 
The experimental approach of this paper can also be adapted to the 
investigation of characteristics of perceptual effects, other than position 
specificity e.g., size (Cohen, 1959), and orientation (Leguire, Blake & 
Sloane, 1982). In the case of perceived size, the manipulation of 
apparent distance cues may disentangle the components. Toppino and 
Long (1987 ) also appear to have overlooked habituation as a salient 
feature in the perception of rotating Necker cubes of different sizes. They 
found that acceleration rate diminished or was eliminated with changes of 
stimulus size. 
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McCollough (1965) reported that the coloured hues commonly 
observed in the McCollough effect desaturated when observers tilt their 
heads. Therefore similarly effective for the independent manipulation of 
cognitive and neurophysiological components in orientation specific 
phenomena, is the introduction of head tilt between the adapting and test 
phases. This manipulates only the retinal orientation of the stimulus. For 
direction of motion, eye tracking movements could be introduced in either 
the adapting or test phases so that the retinal images remains stationary 
whilst the physical object is moving. 
These simple variations to the original experimental paradigm and 
the application of a modified paradigm, as this paper has demonstrated, 
introduces a means to contrast alternative hypotheses which may reveal 
that the accepted interpretations of many perceptual phenomena are at best 
only partially correct. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Baseline data for experiment 1. 
SUBJECT 
NUMBER 
EXPERIMENT 1 
BASELINE HIGH 
EXPERIMENT 1 
BASELINE LOW 
1 119.0 125.8 
2 107.7 109.5 
3 100.8 98.6 
4 103.8 113.1 
5 119.5 121.4 
6 124.6 116.6 
7 96.2 93.7 
8 98.7 99.4 
9 97.0 113.0 
10 90.8 91.9' 
11 107.0 120.6 
12 98.9 101.6 
13 100.6 102.4 
14 102.8 112.2 
15 117.1 105.8 
16 101.2 113.3 
17 101.9 111.3 
18 122.6 115.3 
19 109.9 118.8 
20 84.5 95.0 
Dependent variable is the time in seconds that observers reported the 
'down'percept. 
SUBJECT 	EXPERIMENT 1 
NUMBER CONDITION 1 
EXPERIMENT 1 
CONDITION 2 
1 80.2 102.6 
2 95.2 83.3 
3 77.4 102.4 
4 99.0 111.7 
5 116.5 126.5 
6 89.1 117.4 
7 84.2 95.3 
8 97.9 109.4 
9 96.8 106.0 
10 87.5 105.7 
11 94.5 91.7 
12 92.7 99.6 
13 110.4 118.7 
14 86.3 108.7 
15 111.1 117.3 
16 84.2 96.6 
17 92.8 102.0 
18 99.8 114.5 
19 119.3 117.7 
20 94.3 96.8 
APPENDIX B 
Experimental data for experiment 1. 
Dependent variable is the time in seconds that observers reported the 
'down' percept. 
APPENDIX C 
Baseline data for experiment 2. 
SUBJECT 
NUMBER 
EXPERIMENT 2 
BASELINE HIGH 
EXPERIMENT 2 
BASELINE LOW 
1 120.0119.0 125.2 
2 104.6 109.8 
3 120.2 119.5 
4 107.8 101.7 
5 96.4 108.4 
6 113.8 109.5 
7 108.1 115.2 
8 118.4 125.5 
9 101.1 116.1 
10 119.5 126.8 
11 102.1 97.2 
12 108.0 110.9 
13 107.3 99.2 
14 105.2 106.1 
15 111.7 107.1 
16 101.0 111.9 
17 86.2 92.0 
18 97.7 83.4 
19 118.6 105.5 
20 89.1 86.8 
Dependent variable is the time in seconds that observers reported the 
'down'percept. 
APPENDIX D 
Experimental data for experiment 2. 
SUBJECT 
NUMBER 
EXPERIMENT 2 
CONDITION 1 
EXPERIMENT 2 
CONDITION 2 
1 140.2 150.6 
2 87.4 99.6 
3 119.2 121.2 
4 83.9 86.2 
5 86.0 109.4 
6 102.7 108.8 
7 112.7 107.8 
8 77.0 132.3 
9 103.8 115.9 
10 106.7 117.7 
11 90.6 105.0 
12 84.7 83.9 
13 97.0 95.6 
14 87.7 92.8 
15 91.3 96.8 
16 80.6 84.6 
17 77.0 132.3 
18 99.4 99.8 
19 46.7 55.8 
20 91.6 102.1 
Dependent variable is the time in seconds that observers reported the 
'down' percept. 
APPENDIX El 
Baseline data, bell early. 
SUBJECT 
NUMBER 
BASELINE BELL 
EARLY 
1 87.3 
2 84.2 
3 75.4 
4 100.4 
5 103.6 
6 88.1 
7 86.5 
8 120.0 
9 106.5 
10 106.7 
11 118.5 
12 95.0 
13 86.3 
14 77.1 
15 95.0 
16 64.6 
17 111.2 
18 92.8 
19 98.9 
20 75.8 
Dependent variable is the time in seconds that observers reported the 
'down' percept. 
APPENDIX E2 
Baseline data, bell late. 
SUBJECT 
NUMBER 
BASELINE BELL LATE 
1 100.5 
2 97.6 
3 75.0 
4 104.1 
5 109.8 
6 91.4 
7 94.2 
8 122.2 
9 93.2 
10 98.9 
11 122.8 
12 111.8 
13 72.9 
14 89.7 
15 104.4 
16 59.2 
17 114.9 
18 99.0 
19 102.2 
20 83.4 
Dependent variable is the time in seconds that observers reported the 
'down' percept, 
APPENDIX F 
Experimental data for experiment 3. 
Trials 1 to 6 in 2 sessions, bell early and bell late. 
13.8 20.2 15.0 13.9 13.2 13.0 11.9 11.4 13.3 12.5 15.5 12.0 
14.1 16.4 14.2 12.6 12.8 13.0 15.5 15.7 15.6 14.6 17.2 15.8 
15.7 16.4 15.4 15.9 14.2 16.3 16.6 14.4 14.2 14.4 15.1 12.1 
15.2 17.4 16.4 15.5 15.7 15.7 17.2 16.3 17.6 17.7 18.5 17.8 
11.8 15.5 11.4 11.0 11.5 11.6 17.1 17.6 15.5 17.7 18.5 17.0 
15.4 16.4 14.5 14.5 14.7 14.8 15.1 15.2 15.2 15.2 18.4 15.4 
15.6 17.9 15.6 15.1 15.6 15.1 12.3 14.0 12.6 12.0 16.2 11.8 
18.5 20.1 17.0 17.4 17.6 17.7 19.9 19.0 20.0 21.4 25.6 22.7 
19.0 15.6 10.2 14.1 20.1 13.8 14.2 15.9 18.8 14.9 11.6 16.3 
15.8 17.1 15.7 13.9 15.0 13.4 15.8 15.6 15.4 15.1 23.1 15.6 
19.5 20.6 18.0 21.0 16.8 16.8 24.2 24.7 25.6 24.5 28.3 25.8 
15.2 16.7 15.7 15.0 15.8 15.4 16.0 16.1 15.4 16.7 17.4 19.5 
5.6 7.7 7.0 5.9 4.5 7.4 '12.8 10.5 9.3 9.8 15.4 10.9 
12.0 18.4 13.2 12.1 11.3 11.2 11.1 9.6 11.5 10.7 13.7 10.2 
15.9 18.2 16.0 14.4 14.6 14.8 17.3 17.5 17.4 16.4 19.0 17.6 
13.9 14.6 13.6 13.7 12.4 14.5 14.8 12.6 12.4 12.6 13.3 10.3 
17.0 19.2 18.2 17.3 17.5 17.5 19.0 18.1 19.4 19.5 20.3 19.6 
10.0 13.7 9.6 9.2 9.7 9.8 15.3 15.8 13.8 16.0 16.7 15.2 
17.2 18.2 16.3 16.3 16.5 16.6 16.9 17.0 17.0 17.0 20.2 17.2 
13.8 16.1 13.8 13.3 13.8 13.3 10.5 12.2 10.8 10.2 14.4 10.0 
